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War among (& for) the People

Military Force and Mass Migration in Europe
Matthew N. Metzel and John M. Lorenzen

ABSTRACT: This article provides historical background for
policymakers facing the complex international concern of mass
migration. By examining prior American interventions and
identifying existing policies that support military responses, planners
can begin to develop effective solutions for the current crisis.

I

n 2016, President Donald Trump addressed the topic of Europe’s
mass migration crisis: “If you do not treat the situation competently
and firmly, yes, it is the end of Europe.”1 These words of caution
highlight the growing seriousness of the problem. In 2015, more than 1
million refugees and migrants flooded the southern border of Europe,
with another 2.6 million seeking refuge in Turkey.2 By the end of 2016, the
European Union reported an additional 500,000 illegal border crossings
while Turkey struggled to manage 3.5 million displaced civilians from
neighboring war-torn states.3 For comparison, Italy and Greece received
over 1 million migrants and refugees by sea in 2015, and over 300,000 in
the first nine months of 2016.4 Compounding this challenge, members
of criminal and terrorist organizations have embedded themselves in,
and recruited from, vulnerable migrant and refugee populations.5
Although the United States supports the European community
with diplomatic and economic aid, the cumulative impact of migration
threatens to destabilize several member states within the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization. To achieve strategic objectives for a strong and
resilient security posture within the Alliance, US leaders should consider
employing limited military means to address the problem of mass
migration in Europe.
This article argues the US military should support an overarching
grand strategy to assist European allies facing the complex problem of
mass migration. While current US policy has emphasized the use of
diplomatic and economic support for affected nations, there has been
1      Michel Rose, “Trump Raps Merkel over Migrants, Says U.S. Could Have Good Relations with
Putin,” Reuters, February 9, 2016.
2      International law defines migrants and refugees differently, but the terms are used
interchangeably in reference to Europe’s foreign populations. United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees (UNHCR), The Refugee Convention, 1951, with commentary by Dr. Paul Weis (Geneva:
UNHCR, 1990), 6; Somini Sengupta, “Migrant or Refugee? There Is a Difference with Legal
Implications,” New York Times, August 27, 2015; and “United States European Command Posture
Statement 2016,” United States European Command (USEUCOM), February 25, 2016, http://www
.eucom.mil/media-library/article/35164/u-s-european-command-posture-statement-2016.
3      “Fewer Migrants at EU Borders in 2016,” Frontex, January 6, 2017, http://frontex.europa
.eu/news/fewer-migrants-at-eu-borders-in-2016-HWnC1J; and Mehmet, “Refugee Influx to Turkey
Sharply Rises,” Al-Monitor, November 30, 2016.
4      “Refugees/Migrants Emergency Response: Mediterranean,” UNHCR, October 2015,
http://data.unhcr.org/mediterranean/regional.php.
5      “Fewer Migrants,” Frontex; and Cetingulec, “Refugee Influx.”
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little discussion concerning the use of the military arm of national power
to help address this ongoing crisis. Yet, the examples of World War
II Europe (1944–45), Bosnia (1992–95), and Kosovo (1999), highlight
the historical value of applying US military leadership, planning, and
resourcing as part of a holistic international humanitarian response.
Several key assumptions underpin our argument for increasing US
military involvement to support the civilian response to mass migration.
First, violence and economic hardship in the Middle East and Africa will
continue to drive irregular migration flows into NATO member states,
which will outpace the response capacity of European governments and
conventional humanitarian relief actors.6 Second, Islamic State activity
will spike in Europe as the terrorist organization seeks soft targets to
detract attention from strategic losses in Syria and Iraq.7 Third, terror
and criminal organizations will persist in leveraging the migration crisis
through displaced civilian populations.8 Fourth, European allies will
become increasingly hostile toward migrants and refugees due to real
and perceived economic and security threats.9 Finally, domestic pressure
will cause political leaders within the affected nations to look for options
beyond civilian response activities.

European Security Environment

The recent surge of migrants and refugees from the Middle East
and Africa has placed an enormous strain on the economic, security, and
political stability of several states. The inflows create opportunities for
international terrorists to aim weapons of mass migration toward Europe by
embedding members among the displaced populations traveling from
war-torn regions of the world. Germany confirmed 340 cases of Islamic
extremists recruiting within refugee centers and Europol reported 300
cases of similar efforts.10
The European Union’s efforts since 1999 to strengthen the European
Border and Coast Guard Agency, also known as Frontex, have failed
to address several gaps in immigration security and control, including
legal obstacles that prevent law enforcement collaboration to determine
identities of suspected smugglers.11 Since 2015, migrant-related terror
activity in Europe has spiked, damaging the public’s sense of domestic
safety and injuring an already fragile economy.12 The resulting distrust
6      Liz Alderman, “Aid and Attention Dwindling, Migrant Crisis Intensifies in Greece,” New
York Times, August 13, 2016.
7      Maamoun Youssef, “ISIS Leader Urges Attacks in Europe, U.S.,” CTV News, May 22, 2016.
8       Philip Breedlove, United States European Command: Theater Strategy (Stuttgart, Germany:
EUCOM, 2015), 2; and Ross and Jovanovic, “Paris Bomber.”
    9     “Unemployment Statistics,” Eurostat, August 22, 2016, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat
/statistics-explained/index.php/Unemployment_statistics; and “Migrant Crisis: Tensions Run High
in Lesbos as Refugees Stage Street Protest,” Telegraph, September 8, 2015.
10    Greenhill, “Weapons of Mass Migration,” 11–13; “Germany’s New Security Measures:
Integration Panic,” Economist, August 18, 2016; Shehab Kahn, “European Border Agency
FRONTEX Warns ISIS is Weaponising Refugees,” Independent (London); Meira Svirsky, “13 Percent
of Syrian Refugees Support ISIS: Poll,” Clarion Project, November 1, 2015, https://clarionproject
.org/13-percent-syrian-refugees-support-isis-poll.
11      Nick Mathiason, Victoria Parsons, and Ted Jeory, “Frontex to Get Budget Hike after Refugee
Failures,” EUobserver (Brussels), September 21, 2015; Julian Hattem, “FBI Chief: ‘Gaps’ Remain in
Screening Syrian Refugees,” Hill (Washington, DC), October 8, 2015.
12      Andrew Higgins, “Link to Paris Attack Roils Debate over Migrants in Hungary,” New York
Times, December 17, 2015; and Tim Hume, Tiffany Ap, and Ray Sanchez, “Here’s What We Know
about the Brussels Terror Attacks,” CNN, March 25, 2016.
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is captured in recent opinion polls, where 55 percent of Greeks and 60
percent of Italians believe refugees increase the likelihood of domestic
terrorism.13 Similarly, 72 percent of Greeks and 65 percent of Italians
claim refugees will take domestic jobs and benefits from national
citizens.14 These perceptions have affected European elections, as
the subject of mass migration moves to the forefront of international
discourse. The political—as well as economic, social, and security—
winds in Europe have changed, causing many elected officials to explore
options previously ignored.15
Medical concerns also surround the migration crisis, as displaced
populations historically carry a disproportionate percentage of infectious
diseases, such as human immunodeficiency virus, and hepatitis. In fact,
21 percent of tuberculosis cases in 2007 came from non-EU migrants.16
The European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control recently
stated migrants and refugees have overwhelmed the capacity of several
health service providers, creating gaps in medical treatment and records
management along Europe’s southern border.17 This challenge has
raised concerns from European citizens who question the government’s
ability to protect the health and safety of the domestic population.18

Impact of Mass Migration

Turkey, Greece, and Italy represent three NATO member states
where migration has affected stability. American military planners
should contemplate options to support Allied efforts for coping with
the security, economic, and political challenges that have emerged. The
following information and analysis provides an overview of some of the
challenges, opportunities, and risks that face each nation.

Turkey

Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan are the points of origin for nearly
half of all refugees who crossed Europe’s borders in 2015.19 In March
2016, the European Union announced an agreement with Turkish
President Recep Tayyip Erdogan to curb the massive flow of migrants
traveling north through Turkey. This pact contained the following key
provisions: the European Union would pay Turkey 6 billion Euros to
hold approximately 3.5 million refugees and migrants; the European
Union would accelerate consideration for Turkey’s membership; Greece
could redirect migrants to Turkey; and Turkey would be required to
13      Richard Wike, Bruce Stokes, and Katie Simmons, “Europeans Fear Wave of Refugees Will
Mean More Terrorism, Fewer Jobs,” Pew Research Center, July 11, 2016, http://www.pewglobal
.org/2016/07/11/europeans-fear-wave-of-refugees-will-mean-more-terrorism-fewer-jobs/.
14      Ibid.
15       Erik Kirschbaum and Andrea Shalal, “German Anti-Immigrant Party Beats Merkel in
Her Home District,” Reuters, September 3, 2016.; and interview with German general officer,
September 4, 2016.
16      Tony Barnett et al., Migrant Health: Background Note to the “CDC Report on Migration and Infectious
Diseases in the EU” (Stockholm: European Center for Disease Prevention and Control, 2009).
17      Flavia Riccardo et al., Handbook on Using the ECDC Preparedness Checklist Tool to Strengthen
Preparedness against Communicable Disease Outbreaks at Migrant Reception/Detention Centres (Stockholm:
European Center for Disease Prevention and Control, 2016).
18      Scott Campbell, “Italian Officials Ban Migrants with Potential Infectious Diseases over
Outbreak Fears,” Express (London), July 8, 2015.
19       Phillip Connor, “Number of Refugees to Europe Surges to Record 1.3 Million
in 2015,” Pew Research Center, August 2, 2016, http://www.pewglobal.org/2016/08/02
/number-of-refugees-to-europe-surges-to-record-1-3-million-in-2015/.
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prevent further irregular migration to the EU.20 The agreement has
significantly reduced flows, for now, but with uneven implementation,
the future prospects of the provisions are uncertain. How long the
Turkish government can sustain the added weight of humanitarian
responsibility remains unknown, as unemployment reached 12.1 percent
in November 2016, and the estimated cost to support migrants exceeds
$500 million per month as of February 2017.21 Unfortunately, President
Erdogan continues to threaten European leaders with another flow of
migrants and refugees in an effort to bolster domestic popularity and
leverage further concessions from the European Union.22

Greece

Greece is another NATO ally hit hard by the effects of mass migration.
In 2015, more than 850,000 migrants and refugees illegally entered
Greece, most traveling through Turkey and across the Mediterranean
Sea.23 Many migrants either continued northward or returned to
Turkey, but over 62,000 remain in hastily constructed holding areas.24
Geography also plays an important role in mass migration to Greece,
as this nation serves as a gateway into the rest of Europe under the
Schengen Agreement within the Treaty of Amsterdam. Through the
agreement, residents may travel visa-free across 26 European nations.25
This pact benefits economic trade, but it also adds a degree of complexity
for Greece when dealing with security responsibilities for migrants and
refugees. Nonetheless, Greece greatly benefited from the agreement
between the European Union and Turkey, as migrant numbers dropped
by 79 percent from 2015 to 2016, from 67,000 refugees in January 2016
and 3,500 during August of the same year.26

Italy

According to the United Nations Refugee Agency, Italy also
grapples with the complex problem of mass migration. Prior to the Arab
Spring and the collapse of Muammar Gadhafi’s regime, Italy enjoyed
a controversial agreement with Libya that kept migration from North
Africa within politically acceptable limits. This agreement, under the
auspices of colonial reparation, allowed the Italian coast guard to return
migrants to Libya in exchange for annual payments of roughly $5 billion
US dollars. The arrangement proved to be effective, as Italy received
just 7,300 migrants from North Africa in 2010. However, following the
20      “EU-Turkey Statement: Questions and Answers,” European Commission, March 19, 2016,
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-16-963_en.htm; Alison Smale, “Angela Merkel’s
Trust in Turkey and Greece on Migrants Comes with Risks,” New York Times, March 20, 2016; and
Cetingulec, “Refugee Influx.”
21      Cetingulec, “Refugee Influx.”
22        Safak Timur and Rod Norland, “Erdogan Threatens to Let Migrant Flood into Europe
Resume,” New York Times, November 25, 2016.
23       “Greece Data Snapshot,” UNHCR, March 29, 2016, https://data2.unhcr.org/en
/documents/download/47259; and UNHCR, Greece Fact Sheet (Geneva: UNHCR, February 2017).
24      “Fewer Migrants,” Frontex.
25      Stephan Keukeleire and Tom Delreux, The Foreign Policy of the European Union (London:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 233–34; and “Schengen Area Countries List,” Schengen Visa Info,
October 20, 2016, https://www.schengenvisainfo.com/schengen-visa-countries-list/.
26        “Fewer Migrants,” Frontex; and “Since Alan Kurdi drowned, Mediterranean Deaths
Have Soared,” UNHCR, September 2, 2016, http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/latest/2016/9
/57c9549e4/since-alan-kurdi-drowned-mediterranean-deaths-soared.html.
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upheaval in Libya in 2011, migration jumped to 30,000 and exceeded
100,000 per year by 2014.27
Unfortunately, the recent agreement with Turkey did not reduce
migration to Italy; in fact, numbers increased from 150,000 in 2015 to
over 180,000 in 2016.28 A key problem also involves the risk of drowning
while crossing the central Mediterranean. The United Nations reported
the mortality rate for migrants traveling from North Africa to Italy is 1:42,
and that over 4,100 migrants drowned while attempting to reach Europe
in the span of just 12 months.29 Even with these tragic statistics, tension
between Italian citizens and migrants over the perceived negative effects
to citizen safety and economic security has contributed to such behavior,
including explosions set off by 300 migrants near Turin, Italy, in 2016.30

History of US Military Support

US military leadership, planning, and resourcing has helped curb the
destabilizing effects of displaced populations in Europe during World War
II, Bosnia, and Kosovo, and US military capability can just as effectively
address today’s problem of mass migration. All three examples have
similarities to the current crisis that are based on geographic location,
forced migration, and ambiguity of the role the US military should
have during mass migration crises. Nonetheless, several differences
are evident, including the reasons for mass migration, the size of the
displaced populations, the migrants’ demographics, and the improvements in
international and nongovernmental organizations’ response capabilities.
Notably, the following case studies involve migrants mostly displaced
from within Europe’s borders, while the current crisis involves migrants
and refugees traveling to Europe from the Middle East and Africa.

Case Study 1: World War II Europe

The care and repatriation of millions of displaced persons was a
monumental challenge during the most devastating war in European
history. After Eisenhower took command in January 1944, refugees
and displaced persons were treated as a command responsibility,
and military units cared for and controlled the refugee camps and
installations.31 Planning cells were tasked with managing and monitoring
support for migration and refugee operations from 1944 through 1945,
and their guidance regarding unaccompanied children was adopted
with minor changes by the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation
Administration.32 Despite the lack of clear political direction from US
and Allied officials, Eisenhower initiated an effort that would eventually
27      “Refugees/Migrants,” UNHCR.
28      Steve Scherer, “Record 2016 Pushes Migrant Arrivals in Italy Over Half Million,” Reuters,
December 30, 2016; and Frontex, “Fewer Migrants.”
29      “Since Alan Kurdi drowned,” UNHCR.
30      Stephanie Kirchgaessner, “Tensions Run High in Rome’s Suburbs as Italy Struggles with
Migration Crisis,” Guardian, July 26, 2015; and Oli Smith, “Migrant Centre Explosions: Violence
between Locals and Migrants Shuts Down Italian City,” Express, November 25, 2016.
31      Louise W. Holborn, The International Refugee Organization: A Specialized Agency of the United
Nations, Its History and Work 1946–1952 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956), 3, 15–27; and
Malcolm J. Proudfoot, European Refugees: 1939–52: A Study in Forced Population Movement (Evanston,
IL: Northwestern University Press, 1956), 96, 97, 162–67, 450–68.
32       Proudfoot, European Refugees, 159; and Joseph B. Schechtman, The Refugee in the World:
Displacement and Integration (New York: A.S. Barnes, 1963), 3–4.
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provide humanitarian aid for more than 6.7 million displaced refugees
and migrants during and after the war.33
These efforts were possible because Eisenhower agreed with Field
Marshal Moltke’s statement that plans may amount to nothing, but the
process of planning is invaluable.34 Proudfoot explained the Allies had no
plan for managing mass migration in 1943, or at least no comprehensive
plan that addressed the complexities of displaced populations on the
battlefields of Italy. Eisenhower directed his staff to form a Displaced
Persons Branch to integrate the lessons learned in Italy as part of
contingency planning for the Normandy invasion, Operation Overlord.
These plans were finalized and published just two days prior to the
invasion and their implementation played a pivotal role in mitigating
the suffering of displaced civilians across Europe. A key component of
the plans included tailored guidance to account for disparate regional
challenges—for example, one appendix focused on migration issues
in France, while another addressed refugee contingencies in Belgium.
Finally, the migration plans helped inform resource decisions, such as
Allied trucks to transport food, supplies, and displaced persons and
allocation of military personnel for construction, plumbing, sanitation,
and security services for each refugee support center.35
From 1944 through 1945, Allied planners were faced with the
challenge of balancing limited means to address a growing number
of wartime requirements.36 In one instance, Proudfoot explains, the
Supreme Headquarters directed US Civil Affairs units in Italy to feed
and to transport migrants on the battlefield, but the units did not have
the authority to task the necessary logistical capabilities for their assigned
mission. The planners corrected this problem through military-operated
support centers across Europe that provided subsistence, lodging,
sanitation, medical, educational, and security services for refugees and
migrants. The headquarters also assigned combat support capabilities—
such as personnel from civil affairs, military police, medical, and
transportation units—to operate the centers.
When Germany surrendered in May 1945, Allied forces had provided
humanitarian aid to over 2 million displaced civilians. By September
of that same year, the number had grown to almost 7 million.37 Law
Number 1, which established the principle of “non-discrimination
on the grounds of race, creed nationality, or political opinion” likely
contributed to the American’s successful refugee mission.38 Thus, the
headquarters later facilitated training missions for the newly established
United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration to transfer the
humanitarian mission from military to civilian control.39

33      Proudfoot, European Refugees, 159.
34      Helmuth von Moltke in Peter G. Tsouras, ed., The Greenhill Dictionary of Military Quotations
(Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2000), 364.
35      Proudfoot, European Refugees, 96–97, 162–63, 167, 191, 450–68, 480–81.
36       Jeffrey Record, Revising U.S. Military Strategy: Tailoring Means to Ends (Washington, DC:
Pergamon-Brassey’s, 1984), 1–3.
37      Proudfoot, European Refugees, 96–97; 125–28; 159; 162–63.
38      Jacques Vernant, The Refugee in the Post-War World (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1953), 148.
39      Holborn, International Refugee Organization, 168–69.
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Case Study 2: Bosnia

The problem of forced migration in Europe reemerged in the 1990s,
after the European Commission recognized the independence of Slovenia
and Croatia in January 1992 and Bosnia and Herzegovina in April 1992,
and the United Nations and the European community failed to facilitate
peace within the Republic of Yugoslavia. As the communist regime
crumbled, ethnic fighting began among Muslim Bosnians, Serbian, and
Croatian populations, who comprised 44 percent, 31 percent, and 17
percent of the population, respectively.40 Because of the violence, the
United Nation’s peacekeeping forces in Bosnia were unable to provide
humanitarian relief to thousands of displaced civilians.41 Between 1992
and 1995, an estimated 97,000 people were killed during the Balkan
conflict and over 2.3 million civilians were driven from their homes.42
This disruption caused significant concern for NATO officials due to
the negative impact on the security posture of member states in the
region, and the US military responded once again.43
US military leaders arrived late to the Bosnian conflict, mainly
because senior military and political leaders viewed the situation as a
European problem.44 Warren Zimmermann, former US Ambassador to
Yugoslavia, blamed America’s reluctance on the “Vietnam syndrome,”
while General Colin Powell, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, warned
against committing forces in the Balkans without a clear political end
state.45 However, heightened media attention on the escalating violence in
Bosnia, coupled with the United Nations’ inability to stabilize the region,
pressured Washington to accept a more prominent leadership role.46
Once NATO agreed to the UN request for military assistance,
US military leadership took center stage and provided much needed
direction and motivation to enforce the terms of peace agreed to under
the Dayton Accords.47 In November 1995, US General George A.
Joulwan, Supreme Allied Commander, visited the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees’ headquarters for a personal assessment of
the humanitarian situation in Bosnia.48 He also directed NATO staff to
develop detailed plans, including a time-phased repatriation effort, to
best support peace objectives outlined by the United Nations Security
Council.49 Finally, to show his commitment to the success of this
operation, Joulwan proposed a collocated command group consisting of
NATO and United Nations’ personnel.50
40      Sadako N. Ogata, The Turbulent Decade: Confronting the Refugee Crises of the 1990s (New York:
W. W. Norton, 2005), 50–51.
41      Ibid.; and Walter E. Kretchik, “Military Planning before Operation Joint Endeavor: An
Initial Assessment,” in Robert F. Baumann, George W. Gawrych, and Walter E. Kretchik, Armed
Peacekeepers in Bosnia (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 2008), 69–94.
42       Steven Woehrel, Bosnia and Herzegovina: Current Issues and U.S. Policy (Washington, DC:
Congressional Research Service, 2013), 2.
43      Kretchik, “Military Planning,” 63 and 67; and Ogata, Turbulant Decade, 104.
44      Joyce P. Kaufman, NATO and the Former Yugoslavia: Crisis, Conflict and the Atlantic Alliance
(Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2002), 217; Ogata, The Turbulent Decade, 53; and Kretchik,
“Military Planning,” 68.
45      Robert F. Baumann, “From UNPROFOR to IFOR,” in Armed Peacekeepers, 38.
46      Ogata, Turbulent Decade, 102.
47      Woehrel, Bosnia and Herzegovina.
48      Ogata, Turbulent Decade, 106.
49      Ibid., 106–7.
50      Ibid.
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As in World War II, US military planning played a critical role
in supporting the problem of mass migration in Europe. Similar to
Eisenhower’s planning team, Joulwan’s staff sprang into action within
the Supreme Headquarters.51 These planners led the development of what
would become Operation Joint Endeavor, and provided guidance to the
NATO-led peacekeeping force that would enter Bosnia in December 1995
and transfer the mission to the European Union in 2004.52 Furthermore,
US Army Europe and V Corps planners also played a significant role in
developing a detailed campaign plan that included a large sustainment
force capable of supporting the complexities of an international
humanitarian effort under the terms of the Dayton Accords.53
Resourcing US military forces in Bosnia became a point of
contention within American domestic politics in the 1990s. Many leaders
worried about becoming involved in a European affair with no vital US
interests, while others warned of joining an effort that had no clear exit
strategy.54 However, heightened media attention in the summer of 1995
caused US officials to act by employing military means to help stabilize
Bosnia and provide much needed humanitarian relief to millions of
displaced civilians.55
By September 1995, US ground forces in Europe began training
for peacekeeping operations, and by late December, American military
units entered the war-torn region of Bosnia as part of a NATO-led
peace Implementation Force.56 Resourcing this operation extended past
American political projections, as US forces continued to deploy to Bosnia
from December 1995 through 2004, until being replaced by forces from
the European Union.57 For all the challenges surrounding logistical and
security demands in the Balkans, US military resourcing proved to be
a critical component of a holistic international response to the largest
forced migration crisis in Europe since the end of World War II.

Case Study 3: Kosovo

In 1999, Europe witnessed yet another large-scale forced migration
event.58 Like Bosnia, Kosovo’s migration crisis was a product of failed
diplomatic talks between members of the international community and
Yugoslavian President Slobodan Milosevic. Most of the disagreements
centered on the Yugoslavia’s response to Kosovar separatists.59 Fearing
another Bosnia scenario, the international community quickly intervened
to pressure Milosevic to accept a cease-fire agreement between the Serbs
and Kosovars.
However, as reports of genocide reached the international
community, the UN Security Council authorized a NATO air campaign
against Serb military targets to begin in March 1999. Milosevic responded
by forcing more than 800,000 Kosovars to flee their homes for the safety
51      Kretchik, “Military Planning,” 60.
52      Woehrel, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2–3; and Kretchik, “Military Planning,” 61.
53      Kretchik, “Military Planning,” 71; and Woehrel, Bosnia and Herzegovina.
54      Baumann, “UNPROFOR to IFOR,” in Armed Peacekeepers, 38.
55      Kretchik, “Military Planning,” 68–69.
56      Ibid., 72.
57      Woehrel, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 9.
58      Greenhill, Weapons of Mass Migration, 132.
59      Ibid., 131–33.
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of bordering nations.60 The ensuing migration undermined the security
posture of several bordering nations and placed enormous strain on allied
resolve—for example, 100,000 refugees flowed into Macedonia, creating
a domestic political crisis that required international intervention.61
Meanwhile, another 100,000 Kosovars fled to Albania and 27,000 to
Montenegro.62 The international community would once again turn to
the US military for much needed leadership, planning, and resourcing to
help address the problem of forced migration in Europe.
US General Wesley Clark, Supreme Allied Commander in Europe,
answered the international community’s call for a leader who would
provide the purpose, direction, and motivation necessary to address the
growing crisis in Kosovo. Early in the conflict, Clark warned politicians
in Washington that NATO bombings would become a race against time
since Milosevic would likely increase violence against the Kosovars
in response to NATO air strikes.63 Unfortunately, Clark did not communicate this warning to leaders within the United Nations, who were
surprised by the tens of thousands of migrants who overwhelmed the small
refugee camps located in Albania and Macedonia.64 This communication
failure contrasted sharply with the partnership experienced during the
Bosnia conflict, and seems odd given the repeated warnings by Milosevic
concerning his political weapon of choice in Kosovo.65
Although US military leaders miscalculated the size and scope of
forced migration in Kosovo, they moved quickly with NATO allies to
plan a detailed crisis response effort for the economic and political strain
on flailing border states.66 Specifically, Supreme Headquarters planners
faced several synchronization challenges that included late-arriving
logistical requests from the United Nations, as well as accusations of
encroachment into the oversight responsibilities of UN humanitarian
officials.67 Simultaneously, military planners juggled several domestic
political concerns within the affected border states—for example, the
Macedonian government viewed Kosovar refugees as a security threat
and officially opposed the NATO air campaign, which they believed
caused a spike in migration activity.
In contrast, Albania was generally supportive of NATO military
operations and openly received Kosovar refugees because of their
shared ethnicity.68 Fortunately for the Alliance and the international
community, Milosevic sued for peace within a matter of months,
allowing military leaders to turn their attention to developing plans for
a NATO-led peacekeeping force shaped by the previous campaign in
neighboring Bosnia.69
The US military played a pivotal role in the Alliance’s ability to
resource a well-organized humanitarian operation, especially along
60      Ibid., 132.
61      Ibid., 154–55.
62      Ogata, Turbulent Decade, 144.
63      Greenhill, Weapons of Mass Migration, 151.
64      Ogata, Turbulent Decade, 145.
65      Greenhill, Weapons of Mass Migration, 133, 149–50.
66      Ibid., 149–50 and 166–67.
67      Ogata, Turbulent Decade, 147–51.
68      Ibid., 146
69      Ibid., 143.
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the Macedonian and Albanian borders. Sadako Ogata, the UN’s high
commissioner for refugees, admitted that NATO forces provided a more
efficient system of support to migrants than did her own organization.70
During this crisis, the Alliance’s leaders wisely chose to tap the enormous
potential of military logistical capabilities that provided 4,600 tons of
food and water, 2,600 tons of tents, and 1,600 tons of medical supplies
to affected nations between March and June of 1999.71

Analysis of American Efforts

In each case study, US military leadership served as a pillar and
catalyst for effectively addressing the migration crisis. Although
Eisenhower, Joulwan, and Clark each faced disparate challenges, they
recognized the destabilizing effects that refugees and migrants had on the
security posture of the affected nation-states. All three military leaders
served as the commander of allied forces in Europe, which provided the
organizational structure and command authority necessary to oversee a
multifaceted, international operation. Two of the three leaders seized the
initiative by studying the impact of migration on security and stability
operations and by directing planning teams to develop and coordinate
a holistic, integrated response. However, different levels of success
resulted from variations in leadership style and the authorities that each
leader had in committing the necessary resources.
US military planning served as the second pillar for success,
highlighting the importance of communicating the commander’s intent
and synchronizing logistical requirements associated with the complex
demands of mass migration. Each planning group factored a range of
geographic and ethnic considerations into their analysis and dispersed
limited resources across long lines of communication to achieve their
stated objective. Of the three staffs, the planners during World War
II arguably faced the most difficult task of fighting Axis powers in
Europe while simultaneously providing humanitarian support for over
6 million refugees.
Nevertheless, each of the planning teams faced its own set of unique
challenges—for example, the planners in 1995 operated under a severely
compressed timeline for developing the right-sized peacekeeping force
in Bosnia, while those in 1999 focused on hasty expansion of refugee
camps in Macedonia and Albania. In 1945, planners developed training
programs for UN Relief and Rehabilitation Administration personnel to
assume civilian control of the migrant crisis, while the military focused
on enforcing security zones of separation between warring ethnic
groups to set the conditions for UN aid to the Balkans. Ultimately,
each planning staff succeeded in developing the flexible guidance
necessary to communicate the commanders’ intent while synchronizing
humanitarian relief for millions of displaced civilians.
US military resourcing, especially logistical resourcing, serves as
the third pillar of success for addressing mass migration in Europe. All
three case studies demonstrated a weakness in nonmilitary response
efforts to cope adequately with the massive logistical requirements.
70      Ibid., 151.
71      “NATO’s Role in Relation to the Conflict in Kosovo,” NATO, July 15, 1999, https://www
.nato.int/Kosovo/history.htm.
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Military planners’ recognition of resourcing mistakes made during
operations in Italy greatly influenced Allied humanitarian efforts
following Operation Overlord. Close coordination between the military
leadership and members of the UN helped establish clear lines of
responsibilities for distributing humanitarian aid within designated safe
zones. And, the willingness of military planners to offset the logistical
shortcomings of several humanitarian organizations in Kosovo helped
stabilize the populace and allow for an orderly transition from military
to civilian oversight.

Recommendations

Based upon a complex set of challenges surrounding Europe’s
problem of mass migration, senior leaders should consider employing US
military leadership, planning, and resourcing to strengthen the security
posture of NATO. To this end, the US European Command publicly
announced its intention to work with US interagency partners, while
monitoring the refugee crisis.72 However, there has been little concrete
progress on addressing the existing gaps in European response efforts,
or in designing integrated civil-military contingency plans for a future
spike in mass migration.
Military leaders must seize the initiative to strengthen the security
posture of NATO. Recently, a senior US military leader explained that
limited assets must be focused on the mission of deterring Russia, while
the European Union addresses the migrant crisis.73 Although this is
a reasonable position, considering the high-risk threat of a revanchist
Russia, historical case studies highlight the value of employing US
military capabilities to counter the destabilizing effects of forced
migration. It is also worth considering that humanitarian and deterrence
missions in Europe are not mutually exclusive, but rather interdependent
and essential for achieving a strong and resilient NATO alliance.
Metaphorically speaking, it is important to keep a sharp eye on the
opponent’s queen during a chess match, but it may be the lowly pawn
that creates a checkmate. The decision to apply US military means to
the problem of mass migration is certainly a political one. However,
developing options and contingency plans to address likely security
threats is the role and responsibility of military leaders.
The US European Command should consider establishing a
planning team focused on studying the problem of mass migration in
Europe. Once established, this planning cell should develop a range of
options in coordination with host nation officials, the United Nations,
and other humanitarian organizations. Under most circumstances, the
US military would not lead humanitarian relief operations, but bilateral
or multilateral planning efforts could bridge the civil-military divide
and enable government and nongovernment agencies to understand
unique military capabilities. More importantly, these planning efforts
increase the probability of saving lives while simultaneously stabilizing
the security posture of several European allies. Multilateral planning
is a low-cost, high-payoff activity which would increase understanding
72     “U.S. European Command Posture Statement 2016,” US European Command, February
25, 2016, https://www.eucom.mil/media-library/article/35164/u-s-european-command-posture
-statement-2016.
73     Interview with military leader, September 29, 2016.
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and readiness without detracting from a necessary focus on more
conventional deterrence activities.
Putting plans into action requires resourcing, and there are several
limited ways that the US European Command could approach this
challenge now, which would establish a baseline for larger-scale contingency
operations should the need arise. Congress already funds combatant
commanders to perform humanitarian operations through the Overseas
Humanitarian Disaster and Civic Aid appropriation. The annual requests
for such funding could include estimates for supporting mass migration
contingencies. Planners could also leverage the capabilities of reserve
forces through the use of Active Duty for Operational Support funding.74
This option would allow military leaders to keep active component units
focused on deterring Russia, while simultaneously building individual and
unit readiness in the reserve components through operational employment overseas. Finally, planners should consider including requests for
specified capabilities as part of their annual integrated priority list to the
Joint Chiefs of Staff in support of the program objective memorandum.75
The following recommendations for providing US military support
to Turkey, Greece, and Italy are based on a net assessment of several
gaps in existing capabilities. These recommendations should not be
considered comprehensive, but rather serve as a starting point for
further research, analysis, and bilateral and multilateral planning. It is
worth noting that in February 2016, NATO sent a maritime group to
patrol and report suspected migrant smuggling activity in the Aegean
Sea as part of a security request for assistance from Turkey, Greece,
and Germany.76 NATO forces also contributed maritime forces for
Operation Sea Guardian in November 2016 to support the European
Union’s antimigrant smuggling efforts in the central Mediterranean
Sea.77 The following information highlights the value of providing
additional support capability.
Turkey would likely benefit from targeted US military support
to address issues of protection, health services, and infrastructure
development in support of the 3.5 million refugees and migrants located
within its borders.78 The US Army Corps of Engineers could, for example,
help train Turkish military and civilian agencies in constructing temporary aid stations, schools, and sanitation facilities, using construction
materials paid with funds from the existing agreement between the
European Union and Turkey. In addition, US military physicians could
provide technical training and support to help prevent the spread of
communicable disease and treat the growing number of women and
children with health-related issues.79 Once a resolution is established in
Syria and Iraq, civil affairs experts could assist the Turkish government
in developing repatriation plans for future implementation.80 Regardless
74      Gary Morris, (deputy director, Army Reserve, Program Analysis and Evaluation, Office of
the Chief, Army Reserve), email message to author, February 17, 2017.
75      Ibid.
76      US Army Europe, civil affairs operations officer, email message to author, December 8, 2016.
77      Ibid.
78      “Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan in Response to the Syria Crisis: Turkey,” UNHCR,
November 2015, http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/country.php?id=224; and Cetingulec,
“Refugee Influx.”
79      Cetingulec, “Refugee Influx.”
80      Trump, “Remarks by President.”
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of the support package developed, US military planners should consider
a range of options to help prevent Turkey from becoming an increasingly
autocratic and unstable member of NATO.
Greece could benefit from US military training and assistance
for improved security screening activities. In 2015, several terrorists
entered Greece claiming to be migrants, but they later conducted deadly
bombings in Paris and Brussels.81 Increased intelligence support and
coordination could reduce the risk of future attacks against NATO
member states. US military engineers could also assist with infrastructure
development to improve hastily constructed holding areas that currently
contain over 62,000 refugees.82 Targeted US military medical support
could also help curb the spread of communicable disease in the region,
while reducing the government’s reliance on the success or failure of the
fragile agreement with Turkey.
Finally, although Italy has relatively stable economic and security
positions in Europe, the Italian government could benefit from US
military means. Training opportunities and support packages could
include maritime rescue capabilities to reduce the staggering number
of migrants lost at sea. Unmanned aerial reconnaissance support could
assist Frontex efforts to develop appropriate security responses by
identifying high-risk watercraft crossing the central Mediterranean and
identifying suspected smuggling activities. The US military’s medical
expertise in gynecology, obstetrics, and pediatrics could prove helpful
to the more than 59,000 refugee women and children already located
in Italy.83 Finally, civil affairs personnel could play a role in managing
administrative functions and communication efforts within large
refugee holding areas.

Conclusion

US political leaders should consider employing military leadership,
planning, and resourcing to achieve the strategic objective of a strong
and resilient security posture in NATO. Although the United States
continues to assist allies and partners by providing billions of dollars in
aid, there is no substitute for applying all of the elements of national power
when dealing with the complex challenges of mass migration. Options
for action or inaction include intersecting lines of risk within the larger
question of European security. The case can be made that too much, or too
little, involvement could interfere with long-term US interests; however, it
seems prudent to develop options for senior leaders to consider as part of a
comprehensive strategic assessment of the migrant challenge in Europe.
In the end, the United States must do what it has always done in response
to a crisis that involves its European allies—America must lead.84
81      Andrew Higgins, “Link to Paris”; and Chris Graham et al., “Sources Say Ibrahim El Bakraoui
Was on US Counterterrorism Watch List before Paris Attacks,” Telegraph, March 26, 2016.
82      “Migrant Crisis,” Telegraph; and “Tension Grows, Refugees on Chios Burn Down Refugee
Pre-fab Shelters,” National Herald, October 10, 2016.
83      “Asylum Seekers Monthly Data,” UNHCR, October 18, 2016, http://popstats.unhcr.org/en
/asylum_seekers_monthly; and Sarah Crowe and Chris Tidey, “Record Numbers of Unaccompanied
Children Arrive in Italy,” United Nations Children’s Fund, October 18, 2016, http://www.unicef
.org/media/media_92928.html.
84        
Cheryl Pellerin, “Mattis: U.S. Remains Committed to NATO as Alliance
Transforms,” Department of Defense, February 14, 2017, https://www.defense.gov/News
/Article/Article/1083279/mattis-us-remains-committed-to-nato-as-alliance-transforms; and
Trump, “Remarks by President.”
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